2024 DNC Postmortem (annotated)

Understanding that “little d” democracy is the will of the people and “Big D” Democracy represents the systems and structures in place to advance or inhibit the will of the people, there must also be a review and analysis of the systemic and structural issues.

Unfortunate reductions in support and training for our state parties, consequential shifts in voter registration, a loss of partisan organizing capacity, and a persistent inability or unwillingness to listen to all voters has provided the other major party with opportunities for advancement.

“We the People” is not a new idea, but an enduring philosophy meant to include each generation and every available innovation in its design and operation.

It was Ron Brown who understood every corner of America was hurting and proclaimed his tenure would be less about race and more about 'the races we win.'

The rage of the voters, stoked daily by information silos, talking heads, and even politicians, has contributed to most Americans having a lack of confidence in both parties.

This kind of thinking – denialist at its core – prevents the Party from seeking real accountability, and from making the changes we need to deliver on our promises to the American people.

Subsequent federal court decisions have enabled and encouraged partisan gerrymandering, stripping even the idea of competitiveness out of the broader electoral and civic ecosystem.

Republican primary losses – including House Majority Leader Eric Cantor to a Tea Party challenger – were symptoms of accelerating shifts towards radicalism within the Republican Party.

The ongoing disinformation and denialism orchestrated by Republicans about the events of January 6th is ongoing large-scale gaslighting designed to undermine our entire civic ecosystem.

The sad truth is Democrats have lost ground at every level from inconsistent messaging and improper planning, even as the policies the Party advances continue to earn voter support at the ballot box.

Walker’s inability to muster even a shred of credibility precluded him from winning the election in one of the most polarized states in the nation.

With radical midterm redistricting efforts underway, the writing is on the wall, and the call is coming from inside the House.

On Election Night, the world watched the Blue Wall crumble to return Donald Trump to the White House.

Robinson’s performance must be a wake-up call to Democrats - even without the support of Trump and major organizations, extreme right-wing candidates can still leverage the conservative media ecosystem to engender support and momentum for their platforms.

Voters were willing to split their tickets for governor when faced with unacceptable choices, but voters returned to their partisan corners at the presidential level.

When you can't define yourself and can't generate enthusiasm, you lose even when your party's presidential candidate wins the state.

Even in safe blue states, lower-profile races need affirmative cases for candidates, not just opposition to Trump.

The quality contrast that drove Trump-Stein voters wasn't as stark for AG.

This is a math problem: Democrats can't lose non-college voters by massive margins and make it up elsewhere when non-college voters are a majority of the electorate.

The national campaign appears to have assumed Trump was so unacceptable that persuadable voters would automatically vote Democratic.

The idea Trump’s negatives were “baked in” is a major failure of analysis and reality - given how his favorability has cratered less than a year into this term.

The Harris campaign appears to have relied on Trump being unacceptable rather than building an affirmative case for Harris.

Demographics are tendencies, not destiny, and voter support is impacted - good and bad - through campaign choices.

Brown outperformed Harris by 7.6 points and still lost. His decades of fighting for Ohio workers gave him credibility Harris couldn't match, but Brown could not overcome gravity.

A hospitality worker talking to another hospitality worker about kitchen-table issues carried more weight than any paid consultant.

The 'Bidenomics' framing emphasized macro statistics rather than the micro realities voters experienced daily and specifically tied President Biden - by name - to actual economic anxiety.

Moreno's campaign identified 580,000 'Trump but not Moreno' voters in Ohio.

Starr County, which is 97% Hispanic, flipped to Trump - voting Republican for president for the first time since 1892.

The historical pattern is clear: Trump drives turnout in ways that help him but don't always help other Republicans.

Democrats are essentially raising billions of dollars from retirees, activists, working Americans, and organized labor, and transferring most of it to the pockets of legacy and digital media oligarchs.

It’s no longer enough for campaigns to push information out – they have to pull people in – and digital and social platforms are tools designed for this engagement.

While Democrats do spend more on digital than Republicans, the share of spend is still not fully reflective of where the marketplace is.

Investments in legacy media will miss these voters, and the 2024 strategies did not effectively reach them.

The investment in connected television – $3.4 million more than broadcast, and more than broadcast and cable combined – is notable and an important example for Democratic incumbents and candidates to use.

The national campaigns closely monitor ad spending, seeking to match and mirror their counterparts, and eke out advantages as the campaign progresses.

The Democratic presidential campaign invested where it should, but the Republican campaign was more focused and efficient in matching Democratic ad levels.

In an age of misinformation and disinformation, the answer to the question of “when is the right time to engage actual and potential voters” must always be “now.”

In a world (or state) where significant investment flows more frequently than once every six years, is Sherrod Brown still a Senator?

The right is “always on,” if Democrats do not match this strategy, it will be too late to make the case, much less close the deal.

Fact-checking will not stop the spread of misinformation if the need to signal one’s politics, derogate the opposition, or generate chaos is a more powerful motivator than truth.

Understanding the way in which an overproduced video creates dissonance with a voter based on where they are experiencing it in their media journey is an important step.

Democrats operate in an ecosystem defined by reason even in cycles when the electorate is defined by rage.

Buyers (voters) would not have “remorse” if Democrats had effectively made the case.

The national exit polling indicates Harris lost the 32 percent of voters who identified the economy as their most important issue by 18 to 81, a negative 63 percent margin.

Democrats need to move on from messaging strategies consisting of pushing information and content out, rather than pulling people in.

The hard part is starting, the harder part is keeping it going, but the easiest part is having the humility to listen and learn.

The challenge in reaching younger voters is further complicated by how many young Americans are still part of family plans, so their phone number may actually be associated with a parent or another relative.

Analytics is truth, anecdote is flawed. Others argue sometimes we have to believe our eyes, no matter what the math says.

There are many who argue polling is just fine in terms of what it is - measuring opinion and direction among who it is able to engage, yet surveys can miss things bubbling in culture because surveys can only give you the answers to the questions that you ask.

The third and smallest target group was “peel-away Trump voters,” who had perhaps voted for Trump in 2016 or 2020, but may have been with Democrats on abortion or who were alienated with the chaos and corruption of the Trump era.

The pollsters described their work as underutilized during their initial engagement... they did not see ads until after they were airing, in some instances reading about the ads in the media.

The idea that a prepared and supported Vice President could not have helped the President in the preceding three and a half years is a significant failure of imagination.

They all recognized the attack as very effective, and felt the campaign was boxed – the ad was a video of her saying what she said, and it was framed as an attack on her economic priorities.

The Republicans had a defined framework for attacking the Vice President, but the Democrats did not have a defined or consistent theory for attacking Trump or how to maneuver to disqualification.

These efforts are disingenuous and relatively sophisticated; some start by showing Democrats with an early lead so later polls then show Republican 'momentum.'

The media consultants may not like it, and organizing is one of the hardest things to do in politics, so there will be many within the party who will seek to preserve the current division of labor.

Democrats will not grow in the places they do not sow, and even in current battleground states and districts, Democrats may fail to rebuild a real relationship with voters if candidates and incumbents do not push their campaigns and parties to regain and reclaim organizing muscle.

Face-to-face interaction makes politics come to life and helps voters to establish a personal connection with the electoral process.

With comparatively low spending, the campaign ended up running the same playbook of showing up at the end of a cycle and asking people to support a candidate they had never met, will never meet, and in some cases had never heard of.

It’s time to again ask voters for their help, for their opinions, and to offer them the ability to be a part of something bigger than a single election.

The irony is many of these efforts were emulating what Democrats used to do.

The 2024 cycle shows the inefficiencies of the current ecosystem and contrasts with how Republicans raise and invest across the calendar while Democrats spend at the end (“always on” versus “always late”).

Democrats have long known early money is like yeast – it helps the dough rise.

What can and should be a two-way conversation becomes one-way delivery and a “STOP” message.

Despite constituting only 8.6 percent of contact attempts, door-to-door canvassing represented 50.0 percent of voter IDs.

If Democrats instead continue to rely on ineffective tactics instead of thinking through ways to effectively organize communities so neighbors are talking to neighbors it is acquiescing to an ecosystem defined by its tools, as opposed to designing an effective ecosystem centered on voters.

This is exactly what occurred in 2016, when Secretary Clinton cinched the nomination in Philadelphia 104 days before the election and then discovered there was little infrastructure in place to help her win.

The expansion of access was not easy – and those who favored oppression and suppression resorted to violence, terror, and murder to prevent individuals and groups from being able to vote.

The MAGA-organized insurrection on January 6, 2021 was only the first act.

Failing to plan is planning to fail.

In these digital times, however, analog methods fail to provide the micro-level analysis necessary to shape adaptive campaigns capable of winning anywhere.

With these new capabilities, the Obama/Biden campaign was able to “micro-listen” to what voters were saying/doing, and test the effectiveness of messages aimed at narrow demographic groups.

Interviews with various campaign staffers detailed how the system was known for crashing upwards of 16 hours at a time.

It was essential to catch up to the times and ensure Democrats were on the train and not left at the station once again.

Hawkfish is a cautionary tale about innovation. Win and you’re in, lose and you’re out.

It also includes a multi-million dollar investment in cell phone tools that took the DNC from being able to target 30% of registered voters to 86% by the end of the 2024 election cycle.

By looking at the mix of types of attempts made versus polling data and the eventual outcomes in voting patterns in that state, analysts were able to develop increasingly sophisticated models of voter behavior, though much of this information arrived too late to change the 2024 outcome.

The technical data supports the theory that future election cycles may just well be decided on American welcome mats, suggesting that continued use of donor dollars in this direction generates the highest return on investment.

If VAN had collapsed, the entire get-out-the-vote operation might have transitioned to one familiar with strategists in the 1970s and 80s, with canvassers working with pen and paper instead of smartphones and tablets.

If we have learned anything from the past few election cycles, it is that today’s technological marvel can become tomorrow’s antique faster than we can bat an eye.

Not only is the money necessary for technology investment often allocated at late points in the political cycle, but campaigns frequently default to what they know best over what will work best.

Money, along with big ideas, sweat, shoe leather, and elbow grease, combine into energetic campaigns to persuade and turn out the voters needed to win.

Democrats can and should take lessons from 2024 – when we had much more money than Republicans and still underperformed in critical elections – to revisit the principles, tactics, and outcomes of our fundraising.

As a general matter, campaign money is like water - it seeks its own level, probing for cracks and seeping into the body politic.

McCain was actually forced to borrow $17 million in August and September 2008 to float his campaign until the federal funding transfer was made.

Collectively, campaigns are now more than a cottage industry, they are a double-digit billion-dollar ecosystem with weak regulation and where sharper practices can make a significant difference in driving winning outcomes.

Two thirds of the funds were raised into the one-third of competitive seats.

As a general matter, there is no discernible pattern to the spend associated with a given vote total or outcome.

Democrats did not lose because of a lack of funding – though more would have certainly helped.

Senate and House candidates can take advantage of this lower rate by transferring funds to their state party to cover the production and postage for direct mail, and save themselves money in the process.

Overall, party committee fundraising is a complex, tightly regulated ecosystem.

The ads were nearly identical to the standard campaign ads, but would briefly mention or make a fundraising request in a caption included in the ad.

The Republican non-Presidential JFCs had a more intentional strategy to push the envelope on spending regulations, and were positioned to leverage the deadlock and inaction of the FEC into more direct spending on behalf of their candidates.

In each contest, the leading spender won.

Jackson outraised Bishop nearly two-to-one, and Sunday outraised DePasquale by more than two-to one.

We take their hard-earned cash, yet are spending enormous funds on legacy and social media platforms owned by oligarchs.

Democrats must break with stale and counterproductive practices to Build to Win and Build to Last.

In competitive races, campaign strategists will pore over the campaign finance filings of their opponents, seeking to discern the strategies of the opposing campaigns, and will consider adjustments based on what they see.

In federal campaigns, spending by other entities – party committees, PACs, and independent expenditures – surpass candidate spending – creating a vast ecosystem of billions of dollars spent to shape the landscape and define voter choice.

The $18.8 million Allred spending advantage over Cruz measured against the 11.29 million votes cast in the state works out to a $1.67 per voter spending advantage for Allred – the lowest for any single-digit Senate election.

The 69 districts (15.9 percent of the 435 house districts) accounted for 31.4 percent of all House candidate spending for the cycle.

Republican independent expenditures spent $859.5 million on behalf of Republicans or against the Democrats, and Democratic independent expenditures spent $905.4 million on behalf of the Democrat or against the opposition.

The Republican advantages in non-candidate committee and independent expenditures narrowed the margin in Democratic and Republican spending to a $285.9 million Democratic advantage, and kept Republicans competitive as the campaigns came to a close.

In each contest, the leading spender won.

Given the volume of state legislative races, the combined legislative candidate spending sometimes exceed gubernatorial or other constitutional officer spending.

Campaign finance lawyers took notice, and advised so long as 527 organizations did not coordinate with parties or candidates, they could raise and spend unlimited amounts of money.

In all, IRS filings indicated an estimated $100 million was spent by 527 groups in the 2020 cycle, a figure which now seems quaint.

The 2010 Citizens United and SpeechNow.org cases enabled corporations, unions, and groups of individuals to make unlimited contributions to groups making independent expenditures.

In this vacuum, a surge of resistance energy led to the formation of many new organizations across the partisan and progressive ecosystem – dedicated to issues, story-telling, organizing, training, candidate recruitment, and candidate fundraising.

America PAC – the Elon Musk vehicle – spent $173.7 million, and Americans for Prosperity Action – the Koch fueled entity – spent $151.7 million.

The Republicans were able to activate their oligarchs, and leverage multiple independent expenditures from Musk and others to make up for their lack of fundraising support from everyday Americans.

This is one of the key ways independent expenditures differ from campaigns and parties – with an overwhelming set of investments going to “program” rather than to overhead.

It’s a lot easier for Republicans to close the deal when they have been engaging voters through culture around the calendar and Democrats show up at the end of each cycle, seeking to inform and persuade at the last moment.

House Democrats were on the positive side of the ledger for independent expenditures.

They see the math and maps, and since they cannot change the math of the existing lines, they are trying to change the maps.

The organizations making independent expenditures are known to few, but those few matter.

The largest on the Democratic side, Waterfront Strategies, accounted for 43 percent of all House Democratic independent expenditures, while the largest on the Republican side, Flexpoint Media LLC accounted for 44.4 percent.

The top 30 payees from both parties account for 74.0 percent of the total IE spend – or $2.77 billion of the overall $3.74 billion IE spend.

This includes so-called zombie committees of former elected officials, who continue to spend money through their campaign accounts even if they have no immediate intention to run again for office.

It’s a lot of people and a lot of money.

When an ecosystem invests so heavily in paid media, in fundraising, and events; or in paid voter “contact” through phones and texting, what gets left behind for the next campaign other than lists to rent or sell?

Understanding that “little d” democracy is the will of the people and “Big D” Democracy represents the systems and structures in place to advance or inhibit the will of the people, there must also be a review and analysis of the systemic and structural issues.

This kind of thinking – denialist at its core – prevents the Party from seeking real accountability, and from making the changes we need to deliver on our promises to the American people.

Subsequent federal court decisions have enabled and encouraged partisan gerrymandering, stripping even the idea of competitiveness out of the broader electoral and civic ecosystem.

The ongoing disinformation and denialism orchestrated by Republicans about the events of January 6th is ongoing large-scale gaslighting designed to undermine our entire civic ecosystem.

With radical midterm redistricting efforts underway, the writing is on the wall, and the call is coming from inside the House.

On Election Night, the world watched the Blue Wall crumble to return Donald Trump to the White House.

Robinson’s performance must be a wake-up call to Democrats - even without the support of Trump and major organizations, extreme right-wing candidates can still leverage the conservative media ecosystem to engender support and momentum for their platforms.

Voters were willing to split their tickets for governor when faced with unacceptable choices, but voters returned to their partisan corners at the presidential level.

When you can't define yourself and can't generate enthusiasm, you lose even when your party's presidential candidate wins the state.

The national campaign appears to have assumed Trump was so unacceptable that persuadable voters would automatically vote Democratic.

A hospitality worker talking to another hospitality worker about kitchen-table issues carried more weight than any paid consultant.

Starr County, which is 97% Hispanic, flipped to Trump - voting Republican for president for the first time since 1892.

Democrats are essentially raising billions of dollars from retirees, activists, working Americans, and organized labor, and transferring most of it to the pockets of legacy and digital media oligarchs.

Buyers (voters) would not have “remorse” if Democrats had effectively made the case.

The idea that a prepared and supported Vice President could not have helped the President in the preceding three and a half years is a significant failure of imagination.

With comparatively low spending, the campaign ended up running the same playbook of showing up at the end of a cycle and asking people to support a candidate they had never met, will never meet, and in some cases had never heard of.

Despite constituting only 8.6 percent of contact attempts, door-to-door canvassing represented 50.0 percent of voter IDs.

If VAN had collapsed, the entire get-out-the-vote operation might have transitioned to one familiar with strategists in the 1970s and 80s, with canvassers working with pen and paper instead of smartphones and tablets.

The ads were nearly identical to the standard campaign ads, but would briefly mention or make a fundraising request in a caption included in the ad.

The top 30 payees from both parties account for 74.0 percent of the total IE spend – or $2.77 billion of the overall $3.74 billion IE spend.

When an ecosystem invests so heavily in paid media, in fundraising, and events; or in paid voter “contact” through phones and texting, what gets left behind for the next campaign other than lists to rent or sell?